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The complement-clause construction is a crosslinguistically widespread syntactic strategy for 
representing and communicating about perspectives on situations. With its embedding format, it 
allows speakers to present propositions that they agree or disagree with, to anchor these 
propositions in conceptualizers and to specify the perspectival relationship between conceptualizers 
and propositions, as in dad says [it’s his cake] or I know [it’s my cake] (Verhagen 2005).  
 Children’s sociocognitive ability to represent and reason about their own and others’ mental 
states, i.e. what they and others believe, know and feel, undergoes substantial development at 
around 3-4 years of age (Wellman et al. 2001), and de Villiers & de Villiers (2000) have proposed 
that language plays a causal role in this process. Specifically, de Villiers & de Villiers (2000) 
suggest that the complement-clause construction offers children a unique format for representing 
false beliefs, and this claim has found support in a line of studies with typically developing children 
(e.g. Hale & Tager-Flusberg 2003, Lohmann & Tomasello 2003, Low 2010). 
 Children with autism spectrum disorders have repeatedly been found to exhibit impaired 
sensitivity to others’ mental states (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985, Happé 1994), but also in this 
population, correlation studies have demonstrated a relationship between complement-clause 
mastery and perspective taking (Lind & Bowler 2009). 
 The present study examines the direction of causality in this tight relationship between 
linguistic and sociocognitive development, investigating whether children with autism are able to 
use linguistic perspective marking as a tool for reasoning about divergent mental states. First, I 
report results from a correlation study involving 107 6-to-9-year-olds with autism or typical 
development, showing that complement-clause mastery is a significant predictor of advanced 
mental-state reasoning in both groups. Second, I present a training study including 54 children with 
autism assigned to two training conditions with linguistic mediation of perspectives and two control 
conditions without linguistic training. In the linguistic training conditions, children’s perspective-
taking performance improved significantly, whereas no improvement was found in the control 
conditions. Children trained with complement clauses advanced most, but simpler forms of 
linguistic perspective marking were also beneficial. Together, the two studies indicate that children 
with autism benefit from mastery of the complement-clause construction as a privileged tool for 
syntactic mediation of perspective taking. 
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